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Two politicians in search of a victory: Coalition formation in the new and old world 
 
JAMES L. NEWELL 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Parties’ decisions about the other forces with which they would ally themselves were 
widely thought to have been unusually important to the outcome of the 2006 general 
election in view of the seeming narrowness of the gap between the two main coalitions. 
For example, in a piece entitled ‘How Prodi’s Unione won by a handful of votes’, 
Alessandro Chiaramonte (2008: 214-15) has recently argued for the importance of the 
contribution of micro-lists to the centre left’s victory, suggesting that in the Chamber 
contest, for example, 
 
the 92,002 votes obtained by Progetto Nordest – a minor list that was fielded 
independently of the two coalitions but which certainly drew its support from the 
centre right’s potential reservoir – would have been sufficient to allow the Cdl to 
overtake the Unione; as would the votes of the Pensioners’ Party – which allied 
with the Unione in these elections but which, sub-nationally, has often been a 
partner of the Cdl – or the votes of Alleanza Lombarda, another small party hosted 
by the Unione but clearly supported by voters not of the left. 
 
In fact it can be argued that the outcome was not as narrow as was widely assumed – 
across all three of the arenas in which the Chamber contest took place, the Unione 
outdistanced the centre right by the clear-cut margin of 130,322 votes1 – while there is 
always the problem of knowing how much of an impact parties’ alliance decisions make. 
To argue, for example, that Progetto Nordest, allied with the Cdl, would have been 
sufficient to give the latter victory in 2006, is to make the crucial assumption that when 
parties shift from one alliance to another, they take all or most of their supporters with 
them such that vote distributions are mere reflections of the configuration of party line-
ups. Yet a Progetto Nordest allied with the Cdl would not have been the same offering as 
a Progetto Nordest running independently; while it is not at all clear how one can resolve 
the knotty philosophical problems involved in trying to gauge empirically, the impact of 
something that never happened, i.e. what ‘would have happened if’ Progetto Nordest had 
run with the Cdl.   
 
 However, as we know, a situation defined as real is real in its consequences and 
both analysts and politicians themselves seem widely to have believed in 2006, that 
voters do, by and large, follow their parties whenever these change their alliances. The 
                                                  
1 The three arenas are the domestic and foreign arenas and the one constituted by the Valle D’Aosta 
constituency, in each of which the voting systems differ. It is only the outcome in the domestic arena that 
counts for the purposes of assignment of the majority premium. The fact that in the Senate the centre left 
won fewer votes than the centre right merely tells us – on the assumption that of those voting for both 
branches most do so in the same way (Agosta, 2006: 461) – that the centre right had a moderate advantage 
among that part of the electorate consisting of voters over the age of 25 (Newell, 2008: 246; Corbetta and 
Vassallo, 2006: 423). 
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evidence for this is given by the broad, all-embracing coalitions that were offered to 
voters at those elections. Since, so the reasoning goes, the votes of all parties, even those 
failing to surmount the vote thresholds, counted for the purposes of assigning the 
majority premium; and since, too, the thresholds are lower for coalesced parties than for 
those running independently, the incentive was very much to form the most all-
encompassing coalitions possible. The upshot was that this is exactly what happened, 
with the result that third-force candidacies were very few and far between, succeeding as 
a consequence in garnering collectively less than 1% of the vote in either the Chamber or 
the Senate contest. 
 
 If this analysis is correct, then it becomes a problem to explain why the coalitions 
that have taken shape for the 2008 elections are so very different from those that were 
formed for the vote held just two years ago. Tables 1 and 2 show how radically the nature 
of the electoral supply to be offered to voters on 13 and 14 April will differ from the 
supply offered two years ago.2 What stands out from the tables is that while there has 
been a reduction in the number of lists of about a half, the number of separate coalitions 
has gone up from two to six, each of the two main coalitions of 2006 having split into one 
larger and two smaller components: the coalition led by Veltroni, plus the Sinistra 
Arcobaleno (SA) and the Partito Socialista, on the left; and the coalition led by 
Berlusconi, plus the Unione di Centro and La Destra, on the right. This appears strange 
based on what appeared to be politicians’ assumptions about voter behaviour and what 
therefore constituted winning alliance strategies – assumptions which would enjoin unity 
at all costs.  
 
In a similar vein it poses problems for those who would argue for a strong impact 
of electoral systems on the shape of party systems. Here, the argument was that the 
electoral system, by making parties aware that there were none of the political costs of 
splitting and fragmentation normally associated with plurality systems, would have just 
this effect; in fact, it was said, the system had been designed in 2005 precisely in order to 
make life difficult for the centre left in this respect in the event that it won in 2006: 
parties needed to keep high the profile of their separate identities in order to retain the 
loyalty of their core supporters and did not have to worry if at any given time this brought 
splits or conflict with coalition partners since they could count on being courted in the 
process of coalition formation at the subsequent election. Yet this is precisely what has 
not happened, Mastella serving as the emblematic example here; while in the meantime 
there has, overlaying or alongside any process of fragmentation of parties, been a clear 
trend in the opposite direction: the Partito Democratico (PD) is the obvious example of 
this, but so are the Popolo della libertà (PDL) and the SA. These appear to be more than 
mere alliances of convenience designed for one election insofar as they were conceived 
well before it became clear that early elections would take place and they are apparently 
envisaged, in the eyes of their sponsors, as the, at least potential, precursors of a formal 
amalgamation process. 
 
 There is a third reason why an understanding of coalition formation in the run up 
to 2008 can be deemed to be important. Any explanation of an election outcome, to be 
                                                  
2 Tables are presented from page 16 on. 
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convincing, must account satisfactorily for the three factors necessarily responsible for it: 
that is, it must account for the distribution of voters’ choices; it must account for the way 
in which the electoral system has converted the distribution of choices into a given 
distribution of seats, and it must account for the configuration of parties and line-ups 
among which the voters have been called upon to choose in the first place. In the case of 
2008, this configuration is such that, thanks to the electoral system, there is a distinct 
possibility that in the election’s aftermath Italy will find itself in the historically 
unprecedented position of having something closely resembling single-party government. 
For these three reasons, then, in what remains of this paper we will explore, first, the 
processes of amalgamation to which we have referred and then the process by which, in 
the month of February 2008, the new formations so created came together in electoral 
coalitions. We begin with the PD, whose formation was initiated first.   
 
 
The Partito Democratico 
 
Surveying the Italian political scene in the months leading up to the last election, I cited a 
recent editorial by Eugenio Scalfari (2006) who had made the point that by virtue of its 
very existence, every organisation has its own ethos whose integrity its members seek to 
preserve as the price of the organisation’s continued existence.  
 
But the continued existence of an organisation means precisely the continued 
existence of the issues that divide it from other organisations, so that, if we look at 
the recent past, we find that examples of successful mergers of different parties are 
rare in the extreme…In Italy, the physical presence of the Vatican, and therefore its 
political influence, place enormous obstacles in the way of the merger of a party 
whose roots lie in the Catholic tradition with one whose roots lie in the communist 
tradition (Newell, 2006a: 7). 
 
Since then, the merger has taken place; so the task is to explain why, despite the 
apparently poor prognostications, this is so. Here I can merely list the elements that 
appear to contribute to an explanation. 
 
 First, there was widespread awareness of the need for a large party that would 
play, within the centre left, that same role of ‘coalition maker’ that Berlusconi and Forza 
Italia were able to play on the centre right – that is to dictate, by virtue of their relative 
size, the terms on which negotiations within the coalition take place and therefore to 
impose a minimum of discipline on allies. Needs, of course, are not causes; however, 
needs recognised are; and there had been several well-known efforts in the direction of 
such a party going back at least to Prodi’s call for a single list of the Ulivo parties for the 
European Parliament elections of 2004. Second, therefore, due account must be taken of 
factors of path dependency that will have made it more rewarding or less costly for 
political actors to persist with such efforts than to embark upon another path. One of 
these factors – third – will presumably have been support for the project built up, by 
politicians’ pronouncements, among ordinary supporters of the centre left. Many of these 
were, seemingly, negatively attached to the coalition’s parties while being positively 
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attached to the coalition itself and they seemed to provide proof positive of their 
significance in the overwhelming support they gave in the 2005 primaries to Romano 
Prodi (whose own special project the PD clearly was) and in the 2006 elections when the 
Chamber Ulivo list (at 31.3%) had a clear advantage over the lists of its constituent 
parties (at 27.7%) for the Senate. Fourth, the size of the ideological obstacles in the way 
of merger between ex-communist and Catholic activists may have been reduced by a 
political context in which abnegation of Communism on the one side had made room for 
adherence to a rather indistinct and eclectic set of reformist values – shared on the other 
side by the heirs to a political outlook – that of the left of the old DC – that already had a 
tradition of seeking accommodation with the Communists (Berselli, 2007: 45). Finally, it 
may be that the power of potential losers from the project within the two main founding 
parties will have been neutralised by the steps taken (through the October 2007 
primaries) to give those without any prior involvement with either party the opportunity 
to be involved in the foundation process on the same terms as those with such 
involvement.   
 
 
The popolo della libertà 
 
On the centre right, emergence of the PDL was likewise very much bound up with the 
immediate- and longer-term tensions within the coalition. Like the centre left, the Casa 
delle libertà too was an alliance whose constituent parties were very diverse in terms of 
their ideologies, sizes, geographical strongholds and the interests they sought to represent 
(Diamanti and Lello, 2005: 9). Brought together under the leadership of Silvio 
Berlusconi, they were able to remain united as long as the entrepreneur’s personal 
popularity was essential for their collective success and as long as his party did well. 
Otherwise, the parties were united by little more than opposition to the centre left, and 
whenever Berlusconi’s popularity had shown signs of weakening, they had been 
encouraged to break ranks. They were aware that the political costs were not high – that 
voters are unwilling to switch between the two main coalitions, but increasingly willing 
to shift among the parties within the coalition with which they identified (Natale, 2002) – 
a tendency significantly encouraged by the electoral law. For another thing, therefore, the 
parties have been encouraged to keep in sharp relief, the profile of their separate 
identities: Representing conflicting socio-political interests, they have been under 
pressure to shore up support among their core supporters. Finally, having embraced the 
‘personalisation’ of politics, they have multiplied the tensions within and between 
themselves by transforming what were once contests between parties into face-offs 
between individual leaders (Diamanti and Lello, 2005: 10-12). It was against this 
background that Berlusconi announced, in the so-called running-board speech of 18 
November, that Forza Italia would merge with a new formation to be called the Popolo 
della libertà.  
 
 The announcement was made in the immediate aftermath of the Government’s 
success in getting its finance law approved by the Senate, something that had heightened 
tensions within the centre right by disconfirming Berlusconi’s public prediction that it 
would bring about the government’s fall. For this reason, the entrepreneur’s 
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announcement appeared to contain the implicit invitation to his allies to either put up or 
shut up, and to warn them that if they turned their back definitively on him they risked 
complete marginalisation; for a similarly named party that would unite the forces of the 
centre right had been discussed at least since 2005, and was a proposal with the capacity 
to divide the allies (while attracting the immediate adherence of the coalition’s micro-
formations).3 
 
 
La Sinistra Arcobaleno 
  
The emergence of this formation was a direct consequence of the formation of the PD, 
whose emergence provoked the break away, from the Democratici di Sinistra (DS), of the 
Sinistra Democratica. Since it saw in the merger of the DS and the Margherita the 
simultaneous disappearance – uniquely in Europe – of Italy’s main party of socialism and 
the left, the Sinistra Democratica had as the fundamental objective giving life to it in the 
first place, the unification of the parties of the Italian left in a single organisation. Its view 
of the significance of the PD’s appearance is one that was presumably also shared by 
Communist Refoundation (RC) which, as the largest of the groupings to the left of the PD 
would presumably also have seen in the SA an opportunity to establish for itself a 
position of leadership over the Italian left as a whole. The PdCI and the Greens, which 
had already come together for the purposes of the 2006 election, would presumably have 
seen in the new formation an opportunity to escape the consequences of any new 
electoral law that might penalise smaller groupings running independently. 
 
  The status of the new organisation appears ambiguous: the declaration of intents 
adopted at the Assembly of the Left on 8 and 9 December seems to point to a formation 
that is less than a new party but more than an electoral list; for it refers to the construction 
of a new entity ‘of the left and of environmentalists’ whose organisation is to be ‘unitary’ 
and ‘pluralistic’, but also ‘federal’ – thus perhaps implying that it might amount to less 
than the total confluence of its constituent entities.4 Moreover, its cohesion has also at 
times been threatened by debate over the electoral law. On the one hand, in face of the 
possibility that the Constitutional Court would in January give the green light to 
campaigners’ requests for a referendum on the matter, it seemed for a time that 
                                                  
3 Within AN, Gianfranco Fini was in favour of the single party, which would eliminate the risk of his own 
party being once again ostracised on the far right, and increase his chances of obtaining the leadership of 
the coalition as a whole once Berlusconi retired. But the proposal was disapproved of by the right of AN, 
and contributed to the decision of the high profile Francesco Storace, earlier in the year, to abandon AN, 
something for which Berlusconi was, as a consequence, held responsible. Within the UDC, the proposal 
was viewed favourably by Carlo Giovanardi and his faction but opposed by most of the remainder of the 
party – the encouraging election result in 2006 having reinforced the position of those arguing for a 
heightening of the distinction between the party’s own positions and those of the rest of the coalition.  
 
4 The declaration of intents was seen as the beginning rather than the end point of the drawing together of 
its four signatories, as a proposal subsequently to be opened out to wider debate. PdCI leader, Oliviero 
Diliberto, was apparently opposed to the idea of a single logo for the new formation, and placed the accent 
on the notion of a federation; while Sinistra Democratica leader, Fabio Mussi, and leader of the Greens, 
Pecoraro Scanio, said they were in favour of a single logo and perhaps even of a party (Fusani, 2007). 
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Rifondazione Communista might reach agreement with the PD, Forza Italia and the UDC 
on a reform based on the so-called bozza Bianco,5 the draft reform prepared under the 
direction of Enzo Bianco, chair of the Senate’s Constitutional Affairs Commission. The 
remaining parties were much less enthusiastic and even hostile, prepared – if such action 
was necessary to block reform disadvantageous to them – to threaten the future of the 
SA.6 This then begs the question of why it was that despite these tensions in January, the 
four components were nevertheless able to agree, in February, to field a single list for the 
general election. Answering this question involves turning a spotlight on the forces that 
drove coalition formation generally that month.   
 
 
Coalition formation in February 
 
The first, and the decisive, move was made by Walter Veltroni when he declared that at 
the next election the PD would run alone, whatever the electoral law. A possibility to 
which he had alluded for the first time several months previously,7 it probably 
contributed to the Prodi government’s fall since it in effect said to the coalition’s smaller 
components that they could not count on their larger governing partner to assure them 
representation in a future parliament – thus leaving them, once the Constitutional Court 
had given the go-ahead for the referendum, with a simple choice: either to allow the 
Government to continue and risk, in the spring, a referendum outcome unfavourable to 
them, or else to attempt to avert this risk by bringing the Government down. The centrist 
components which in fact toppled the Government were those whose placement on the 
political spectrum made it likely that if they could not, in the ensuing elections, find allies 
in their ‘own’ coalition, then they could assure their survival by passing over to the other 
side. 
 
 The logic underlying the seemingly irrational confirmation by Veltroni, on 5 
February, that his party would not seek allies, was explained by Giovanni Sartori when, 
in the course of an edition of the TV programme, Annozero, broadcast on 7 February, he 
                                                  
5 This envisaged a law based on the principle that 50% of the Chamber seats would be distributed in single-
member constituencies, 50% proportionally, in 32 multi-member constituencies, with a 5% national vote 
threshold or 7% in at least five regions. The voter would cast a single vote, which would be used to 
determine assignment of both the single-member and the proportional seats. In the case of the Senate, 
candidates would be elected, within each region, through single member constituencies with candidates not 
so elected being eligible to participate in the distribution of additional seats assigned to the region. These 
sets would be distributed proportionally among those candidates achieving at least 5% of the vote in the 
region concerned. It was thought that this might just also bring on board the UDEUR which would thus 
obtain protection for its regional base in Campania where it took 5.2% in the Senate contest in 2006 
(Fusani, 2008). 
 
6 In January, Oliviero Diliberto said, ‘The Bianco draft cannot be improved; it is un-presentable. If we 
agreed on everything, we would be in the same party. But the Sinistra Arcobaleno was born in order to 
protect the interests of the workers; on the electoral law everyone will come to their own conclusions’ 
(Scarchilli, 2008). 
  
7 In the preface to a book called La nuova stagione (Rizzoli) and then in an article published in la 
Repubblica on 24 August. See Veltroni (2008). 
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described the decision as ‘courageous’ (valorosa). On the one hand, fighting the elections 
on the basis of the coalition that had presented itself in 2006, and therefore, having to 
defend a government that despite everything was deeply unpopular, was not a winning 
proposition.8 On the other hand, an independent stance would give Veltroni bargaining 
power that Prodi never had, enabling him to offer to the micro-formations, an 
arrangement that would be confined to places on his lists and on his terms, failing which 
these formations might risk electoral annihilation. Three further related considerations 
may have played a role in the decision. First, by far and away the most probable outcome 
was that Berlusconi would win. On that basis, running alone had the advantage that, since 
the thresholds are higher for non-aligned than for aligned lists,9 the seats not assigned to 
the winning coalition would have to be shared with fewer lists (Floridia, 2008).10 Second, 
Veltroni’s strategists might have made the point that though unlikely, victory 
nevertheless remained a possibility and perhaps a greater possibility if, through an 
independent stance, he was able to present the PD as something new, rather than a re-
edition of the past. Third, they might also have suggested that an independent stance 
would in any case most likely squeeze the vote of rivals, especially on the left, whose 
supporters would be forced to decide between a vote for their most preferred choice and a 
voto utile for the formation most likely to defeat the prospect of their least preferred 
outcome.11 
 
 As Antonio Floridia (2008) has pointed out, the initial move by Veltroni, then set 
off, in the days following his announcement, a sequence of actions and reactions on the 
part of the other main political actors that showed how the construction of the electoral 
offer for 2008 could be explained as a game of strategic interdependence given the 
framework of constraints imposed by the electoral system. 
 
 The second move in order of time, then, came from the parties of the SA, whose 
initial reaction was, predictably, one of division. On the one hand, Rifondazione was 
prepared to run independently, believing, on the basis of its past performances that it 
could surmount the thresholds whether these were the lower ones for coalesced parties or 
the higher ones applying to independent formations. On the other hand, the remaining 
parties were not in this fortunate position; and not unnaturally, the Greens and the 
Sinistra Democratica, in particular, pushed hard for an understanding with Veltroni (la 
                                                  
8 As opinion polls confirmed. See, for example, Gualerzi (2008). 
 
9 For Chamber elections, lists must attract at least 4 percent of the national total of valid votes cast if they 
are running independently or as part of a coalition whose combined total turns out to be less than ten per 
cent. If they are part of a coalition whose combined total is ten percent or more, then they must obtain at 
least 2 percent of the national valid vote total or be the coalition’s largest formation below this figure. In 
the Senate, the corresponding percentages, calculated at regional level, are eight, twenty and three 
respectively. 
  
10 It might also put the likelihood of a Berlusconi victory at considerable risk in the Senate: here, much 
would depend on the regions in which the only two formations capable of exceeding eight per cent other 
than the main two, actually succeeded in doing so: see Manheimer (2008: 12). 
 
11 At least in the Chamber. For the Senate contest, the situation would vary, depending on the region of 
residence of the voter concerned. See the final section of the present paper. 
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Repubblica, 2008: 6). In the end, however, divorce between Veltroni and SA leader, 
Fausto Bertinotti, was consensual (Meli, 2008: 8). In the first place, both needed to mark 
a break with the experience of the Unione coalition – Bertinotti in order to escape the 
dilemma the experience had necessarily created for his party in attempting to be di lotta e 
di governo (Albertazzi, McDonnell and Newell, 2007). In the second place, that decision, 
once it had been taken, automatically gave RC enormous power vis-à-vis its allies, over 
whom it could establish hegemony: like the PD, it too could, because of the electoral-law 
thresholds, now reject a coalition, insisting instead on a single list which would, of 
course, be drawn up on its terms. 
 
 Even more dramatic were the consequences of Veltroni’s initial move for the 
centre right. Here it swiftly became apparent to Berlusconi’s advisors that if Veltroni was 
going to fight the election as the leader of a new formation, one turning its back on ‘the 
idea that what counts is…to beat the opposing line-up by fielding the broadest coalition 
possible regardless of its cohesion and actual capacity to govern the country’ (Veltroni, 
2007), then the entrepreneur could hardly counter this by himself cobbling together a 
coalition of several lists. The question then was, what coalition was to be constructed and 
on what basis? It was a question whose answer reflects the same logic as that at work 
elsewhere in the party system. In the first place, once fresh elections had been announced, 
the belief that the probable winner would be Berlusconi quickly put the entrepreneur back 
in the driving seat of his part of the political spectrum, the recent tensions with his allies 
being quickly forgotten. In the second place, the PDL had already been launched as the 
prospective new unified party of the centre right. In effect, these two elements put 
Berlusconi in a rather similar position vis-à-vis his own potential allies as the one in 
which Veltroni found himself vis-à-vis his allies. Fini was more-than-willing to 
countenance the idea of a single list fielded under the name ‘Popolo della libertà’ as long 
as he could be satisfied that it really was the prelude to a new unified party – whose 
leadership he, of all potential contenders, would be the best placed to assume after 
Berlusconi. Bossi was in a different position, less vulnerable to the threat of re-isolation 
on the far right and with a reservoir of support whose geographical distribution was 
highly concentrated. With the power, therefore, to split the centre-right vote in the north 
perhaps delivering the Senate to the PD if the contest were close, he was able to obtain a 
coalition agreement declining the invitation to renounce his party’s separate identity 
within a single list. Third, the micro-formations on the other hand – those such as Dini’s 
Liberal Democratici, Rotondi’s DC and so on – were in no position to resist this and 
quickly fell into line (Buzzanca, 2008: 2).12 That left the UDC and la Destra, which were 
                                                  
12 Mastella, having contributed decisively to the fall of the Prodi government, claimed in March that with 
the benefit of hindsight he would think ten times over before doing something similar again (Zuccolini, 
2008: 11) – not surprisingly: in the political situation that emerged following the Government’s fall, his 
bargaining power collapsed. As negotiations with Berlusconi became increasingly difficult, he was 
abandoned by his followers and his party rapidly disintegrated. Mastella being unable to find a home for 
himself or his few remaining followers anywhere, it was claimed that he was betrayed by a Berlusconi who 
had promised him a number of places in his lists and then reneged on the promise in the face of polls 
suggesting that it would lose him votes (Milella, 2008: 9). In the end, therefore, Mastella was forced to 
acknowledge complete defeat, announcing that neither he nor his party would contest the election at all. 
Mastella’s must, surely, count as one of the most spectacular and picturesque of political miscalculations in 
the history of post-war Italian politics   
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in a rather different position to the one occupied by the micro-formations in that they 
were more than just ‘virtual’ or ‘personal’ parties, and had identities and genuine political 
traditions to defend. Faced with the choice between the threat of liquidation or defence of 
their autonomy, albeit in unfavourable circumstances, they chose the latter (Di Caro, 
2008: 2).                    
  
 Finally, it remains to account for Veltroni’s decision somewhat to blur the clarity 
of his decision to ‘run alone’, by agreeing to accommodate the Radicals within the PD’s 
lists and to agree to a coalition arrangement with di Pietro’s Italia dei Valori (IdV). 
Antonio Floridia (2008) of the Tuscan Electoral Observatory argues that in the case of 
IdV, the decision was dictated by a close examination of opinion polls and previous 
election results which suggested that di Pietro’s party might be decisive with regard to the 
outcome for the Senate contest in a number of regions, and that it could be expected to 
bring with it the support of those voters driven above all else by the anti-political 
sentiments widespread in the Italian electorate (Vecchi, 2008: 13). The terms of the 
agreement were that in exchange for the freedom to contest the elections beneath his own 
symbol, di Pietro would in the aftermath agree to the end of a separate existence for his 
party, leading his followers into a single parliamentary group with the PD. In the case of 
the Radicals, the reasoning was, by contrast, that while their involvement might lead to 
the loss of Catholic votes, it would also reassure voters with left-wing sympathies that the 
new PD would not concede too much to those in the party whose sympathies are, by 
contrast, strongly driven by religious values and who therefore take strongly conservative 
positions on ethical and civil liberties issues. The terms of the agreement with them were 
that in exchange for the loss of visibility implied by the absence of a coalition agreement, 
and a PD veto over those to be fielded, nine good places would be found for their 
candidates within the lists to be presented by the PD, with the high-profile Emma Bonino 
to head the list in Piemonte. 
 
 
Conclusions and implications 
 
In this paper we have tried to make sense of the process of coalition formation as it 
unfolded in the weeks leading up to the 2 March deadline for depositing electoral 
symbols at the Ministry of the Interior. That is, we have tried to explain the process by 
deciphering the reasons for it – putting ourselves in the position of the actors whose 
behaviour we are trying to explain so that their actions appear appropriate, or in other 
words, appear as actions that we can imagine ourselves performing were we in their 
position (Winch, 1958). 
 
 Our methodological and normative commitment to this approach leads us to hope 
that once the election has been held commentators will resist that temptation to be wise 
after the event that many failed to resist in the immediate aftermath of 2006. Then, the 
unexpected narrowness of the centre left’s victory was – for example – explained as the 
result of a campaign by Prodi that, in contrast to Berlusconi’s fiery populism, was both 
‘dull’ and ‘affected’ (Berselli, 2006). The problem with this judgement is that it is 
contaminated by knowledge of the outcome – which thus gives undue credibility to what 
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is in realty no more than conjecture: at the time, the histrionic quality of Berlusconi’s 
pronouncements fed the impression (I would venture to suggest) not of an effective 
campaign, but of a government increasingly desperate and lacking in credibility. No 
doubt, had the margin of Prodi’s victory been ever so slightly greater ‘it would’ – as we 
wrote at the time – ‘have been said that [he had achieved victory] because while 
Berlusconi’s frantic populism failed to convince voters disillusioned by the absent 
miracle, Prodi’s campaign was sober and highly effective in appealing to competence 
etc.’ (Newell, 2006b: 22).13 So, with an eye on the results of the last poll to be published 
before the ‘blackout’ on the publication of poll findings comes into force for the last two 
weeks of the 2008 campaign, our hope is that Veltroni and Bertinotti will escape public 
criticism if the distribution of the Chamber vote reflects the poll (showing 39% for the 
PD, 6% for the SA and 45% for the PDL)14 and gives the majority premium to 
Berlusconi. 
 
 This throws a spotlight on our third conclusion and that is, that our ‘findings’ 
provide little comfort for either of the two perspectives with which we started, namely, 
the one according to which coalition formation is driven by an assumption on the part of 
politicians that voters almost invariably follow where parties lead – were it so our 
reconstruction would make no sense – and that electoral systems have a strong influence 
on the process. Obviously, (actors’ understanding of the effects of) the electoral system 
does play a part. But the nature of the electoral system is neither a necessary, nor a 
sufficient condition for any given strategic choice or set of strategic choices: it is not a 
necessary condition because these choices changed dramatically between 2006 and 2008 
even though the electoral system remained unchanged; while the clear importance, to the 
change choices, of the PD’s emergence, of the circumstances of its emergence and of all 
the strategic implications that flowed there-from suggest that it is probably not a 
sufficient condition either. Floridia’s (2008) attempt to add to electoral-system 
characteristics others that will together constitute a sufficient condition is interesting. He 
argues that the Italian electoral system will lead to coalitions reflecting the principle of 
maximum inclusivity provided that two further conditions are met: (1) that the principal 
political actors around which the two coalitions are formed assume that the outcome is 
uncertain; (2) that the principal actors act in accordance with an immediate-term logic. 
When, by contrast, the outcome is deemed to be a foregone conclusion, then the actor 
facing defeat is concerned less with the game currently being played than with the 
benefits that might be derived in the future; and she faces the opposite incentive: the 
                                                  
13 We take a similar view of the widely held thesis of a Berlusconi rimonta in the closing stages of the 2006 
campaign: a thesis that too arises from the gap between the expectations based on the centre left’s pre-vote 
poll lead and the smallness of the distance between the two coalitions in terms of actual votes, it is faced 
with four challenges: 1) when compared not with poll results but the results of the two previous general 
elections the actual distance between the two coalitions in much less surprising; 2) if the pre-vote polls 
accurately reflected a centre-left lead that was then eroded, it remains to be explained why exit polls, on the 
two days of the vote, predicted a very similar lead; 3) the vote for Berlusconi’s own party declined from 
29.4% in 2001 to 23.7%: a record loss; 4) the 24,755 votes separating the two coalitions in the Chamber 
domestic, majority-premium, arena was arguably due, not to a comeback, but to the electoral law and the 
consequent breadth of the two coalitions – which virtually eliminated ‘third-force’ candidacies and meant 
that votes for such forces would effectively be wasted votes in any case. 
 
14 For details see Biorcio and Bodignon (2008). 
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incentive to create the smallest viable coalition in order to have to divide the seats due to 
the opposition among the smallest number of lists. 
 
 This prompts two comments. First, we are sceptical of the implicit claim of 
‘rational-choice institutionalism’ (of which this purports to be an example) to offer an 
alternative to the interpretive approach we have argued for: it is in reality itself a form of 
interpretation insofar as it unavoidably relies for its very intelligibility on assumptions 
about actors’ reasons. Second, then, the example given is problematic even accepting its 
own epistemological assumptions: uncertainty is a variable; so, depending on how much 
uncertainty there is, it by no means follows that the principle of maximum inclusivity is 
necessarily the best strategy: this is – precisely – uncertain. What we can say is that as far 
as the two largest actors, both above the vote thresholds are concerned, to run in coalition 
with a third force will be the best strategy if it is ‘reasonable’ to suppose that that force’s 
support is likely to be large to enable it to cross the threshold and to determine to which 
of the first two forces the majority premium will accrue. On the other hand, if there is a 
third force capable of surmounting the threshold but not of determining allocation of the 
majority premium, then it may make more sense to run separately – for then it will share 
in the distribution of seats due to the opposition parties, to the disadvantage of the largest 
of these. Therefore, in Tuscany, for example, for the Senate race the actual coalition 
structure makes more sense from the point of view of the PD than did the one that took 
shape in 2006: the point is that the PD can be reasonably certain of winning the majority 
premium there, on its own, anyway and so needs to be concerned with what happens to 
the seats accruing to its competitors. Here it needs to hope for the best result possible for 
the SA in order to reduce as much as possible the chances of Berlusconi obtaining a 
Senate seat majority nationally. In Tuscany, then, the best strategy for the voter of the 
left, concerned to defeat Berlusconi, will be to vote for the PD in the Chamber race and 
the SA in the Senate race. Elsewhere, for example in Abruzzo (see below and Table 3), 
the SA splits the vote, so that here, the same voter in better off casting his/her vote for the 
PD in both elections. 
   
 Where we do find ourselves in agreement with Floridia’s analysis is where he 
likens the process of coalition formation to Gulliver and the Lilliputians, the large parties 
wriggling free of the ties and laces by which the smaller parties, through the exercise of 
blackmail power given to them by the electoral law, had previously bound them. From 
this perspective, we think that coalition formation in 2008 tends to make our case for an 
interpretive approach in a different way; for what it illustrates is that parties, just like 
ordinary people, only have blackmail power as long as those they are attempting to 
blackmail accept the presuppositions upon which the attempted exercise of that power is 
based. As soon as they reject these, the power vanishes, whatever the electoral law. 
Hence the importance, for explanatory purposes, of attempting to understand their point 
of view. In the present context this means that we have to take seriously Veltroni’s own 
view, cited earlier, of the PD’s raison d’être. 
 
 Finally, turning from causes, to the consequences of the process of coalition 
formation, it is interesting to consider the process’ possible impact on the outcome of the 
election for the Senate, surrounding which there currently appears, as compared to the 
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Chamber race, to be the greater degree of uncertainty. We can compare the 2006 results 
for the Unione and the Cdl with the results that will obtain in 2008 if the distribution of 
votes between the parties belonging to each coalition remains the same as the 
corresponding distribution in 2006. In that case we can take the resulting figures as 
offering a suggestion about the possible/probable impact on the outcome of the changed 
coalition arrangements alone, if parties’ performances are essentially the same as they 
were two years’ earlier (perhaps not an unreasonable assumption on the basis of what we 
know about Italian voters and the distribution of the vote at previous elections (Newell, 
2006b; 2006c)). The data in question are shown in Table 3.15 
  
 On the basis of these assumptions, the PDL would emerge in front in the Senate 
but without the overall majority needed to enable it to govern comfortably. Even if it 
managed to bring the UDC back on board, it would remain in a numerically precarious 
position. Obviously, beyond a certain point, any discussion of possible future scenarios 
degenerates into speculation and has little intellectual value. However, two things may be 
suggested in closing. One is that it might be reasonable, once the result is known, to 
compare our ‘virtual’ results with the actual results to obtain a measure of how much of 
the change as compared to 2006 will have been due to changes in the nature of the 
political supply and how much to changes in the nature of the demand (though the 
caveats previously mentioned in this connection will continue to apply). Second, 
whatever the outcome, it will, almost certainly, have a very significant impact on the 
further evolution of the structure and dynamics of the party system. We could see 
something approaching single-party government – but unless proposed changes to 
Parliament’s standing orders, advanced in the last legislature, are taken forward, we 
might see the re-emergence of fragmentation and a continuation of instability. Everything 
will depend on the specifics of seat distribution in the new parliament and on the meaning 
that is attached to it by those most directly involved.  
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Table 1 Coalitions, lists and component parties competing in the Chamber of Deputies elections 2006 and 
2008 
  
2006 2008 
Coalitions Lists Component parties Coalitions Lists Component parties 
l’Unione L’Ulivo DS Sinistra Arcobaleno Sinistra 
Arcobaleno 
Communist 
Refoundation 
  Margherita   PdCI 
  Movimento 
Repubblicani Europei 
  Greens 
 Communist 
Refoundation 
   Sinistra Democratica 
 La Rosa nel pugno Socialists Coalition led by 
Walter Veltroni 
Partito 
Democratico 
Partito Democratico 
  Radicals   Radicals 
 PdCI PdCI  Italia dei Valori  Italia dei Valori 
      
      
 Italia dei Valori Italia dei Valori Partito Socialista Partito 
Socialista 
Partito Socialista 
 Greens Greens Unione di Centro UDC UDC 
 UDEUR UDEUR   Rosa Bianca 
 Pensioners’ Party Pensioners’ Party   De Mita 
 SVP SVP Coalition led by 
Silvio Berlusconi 
Popolo della 
libertà 
Forza Italia 
 Other Unione lists    National Alliance 
Casa delle 
libertà 
Forza Italia    DC 
 National Alliance    Liberaldemocratici 
 UDC    Azione Sociale 
 Northern League-
MPA 
Northern League   New PSI 
  MPA   Partito Repubblicano 
Italiano 
 DC-New PSI DC   Pensioners’ Party 
  New PSI  Northern 
League  
Northern League 
 Alternativa 
Sociale 
  MPA MPA 
 Fiamma Tricolore  La Destra La Destra La Destra 
 Other Cdl lists    Fiamma Tricolore 
      
      
      
      
      
      
Others   Others   
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Table 2 Coalitions, lists and component parties competing in the Senate elections 2006 and 2008 
  
2006 2008 
Coalitions Lists Component parties Coalitions Lists Component parties 
l’Unione DS DS Sinistra Arcobaleno Sinistra 
Arcobaleno 
Communist 
Refoundation 
 Margherita Margherita   PdCI 
 Movimento 
Repubblicani 
Europei 
Movimento 
Repubblicani 
Europei 
  Greens 
 Communist 
Refoundation 
   Sinistra Democratica 
 La Rosa nel pugno Socialists Coalition led by 
Walter Veltroni 
Partito 
Democratico 
Partito Democratico 
  Radicals   Radicals 
 Together with the 
Unione 
PdCI  Italia dei 
Valori  
Italia dei Valori 
  Greens    
 Partito dei Socialisti 
(Craxi) 
Partito dei Socialisti 
(Craxi) 
   
 Italia dei Valori Italia dei Valori Partito Socialista Partito 
Socialista 
Partito Socialista 
 Greens Greens Unione di Centro UDC UDC 
 UDEUR UDEUR   Rosa Bianca 
 Pensioners’ Party Pensioners’ Party   De Mita 
 SVP SVP Coalition led by 
Silvio Berlusconi 
Popolo della 
libertà 
Forza Italia 
 Other Unione lists    National Alliance 
Casa delle 
libertà 
Forza Italia    DC 
 National Alliance    Liberaldemocratici 
 UDC    Azione Sociale 
 Northern League-
MPA 
Northern League   New PSI 
  MPA   Partito Repubblicano 
Italiano 
 DC-New PSI DC   Pensioners’ Party 
  New PSI  Northern 
League  
Northern League 
 Alternativa Sociale   MPA MPA 
 Fiamma Tricolore  La Destra La Destra La Destra 
 Casa delle Libertà    Fiamma Tricolore 
 Other Cdl lists     
      
      
      
      
      
Others   Others   
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Table 3 Actual and ‘virtual’ results for coalitions by region, Senate 2006-2008 
 
2006 actual results 
 
              Regions % of votes  No. of seats 
 UNIONE CDL Others  UNIONE CDL Others 
                      Piemonte  49.5 50.5 0.0  9 13 0 
Valle d'Aosta 45.6 22.4 32.0  1 0 0 
Lombardia  42.6 56.9 0.4  20 27 0 
Trentino-Alto Adige 62.7 33.1 4.2  5 2 0 
Veneto 39.5 57.1 3.4  10 14 0 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 44.4 54.8 0.7  3 4 0 
Liguria 53.3 46.7 0.0  5 3 0 
Emilia Romagna 59.4 40.6 0.0  12 9 0 
Toscana 61.3 38.7 0.0  11 7 0 
Umbria 57.2 42.8 0.0  4 3 0 
Marche 54.4 45.6 0.0  5 3 0 
Lazio 49.1 50.2 0.6  12 15 0 
Abruzzo 53.2 46.8 0.0  4 3 0 
Molise 50.5 49.5 0.0  1 1 0 
Campania  49.6 49.1 1.3  17 13 0 
Puglia 47.9 51.9 0.2  9 12 0 
Basilicata 60.4 39.2 0.5  4 3 0 
Calabria 56.8 42.6 0.7  6 4 0 
Sicilia  40.5 57.8 1.7  11 15 0 
Sardegna 50.9 45.3 3.8  5 4 0 
        Foreign constituency 48.5 37.8 13.7  4 1 1 
        TOTAL 49.2 49.6 1.3  158 156 1 
               
2008 ‘virtual’ results 
 
                  Regions   Votes %     No of seats  
 PD/IdV PDL/LN SA UDC Others PD/IdV PDL/LN SA UDC Others  
                           Piemonte 34.6 44.4 12.5 6.6 1.9 7 12 3 0 0  
Valle d'Aosta 44.2 19.2 - 3.1 33.5 1 0 0 0 0  
Lombardia 27.2 51.5 11.7 5.9 3.7 15 26 6 0 0  
Trentino-Alto Adige 34.5 30.5 - - 35.0 3 2 0 0 2  
Veneto 28.3 49.3 8.7 7.9 5.8 8 13 3 0 0  
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 32.4 48.3 10.0 7.0 2.3 2 4 1 0 0  
Liguria 37.8 42.0 13.2 6.0 1.0 2 5 1 0 0  
Emilia Romagna 45.0 35.1 13.0 5.8 1.1 12 7 2 0 0  
Toscana 43.6 32.5 16.0 6.0 1.9 10 5 3 0 0  
Umbria 41.2 36.2 14.8 6.6 1.2 4 2 1 0 0  
Marche 40.0 37.2 12.9 8.1 1.8 5 2 1 0 0  
Lazio 33.8 43.2 13.0 7.1 2.9 9 15 3 0 0  
Abruzzo 38.4 41.2 10.9 7.2 2.3 2 4 1 0 0  
Molise 42.1 48.3 7.6 - 2.0 1 1 0 0 0  
Campania 32.7 48.1 10.4 5.3 3.5 10 17 3 0 0  
Puglia 33.1 44.9 9.4 8.1 4.5 6 12 2 1 0  
Basilicata 41.6 37.9 11.3 5.8 3.4 4 2 1 0 0  
Calabria 31.8 43.1 11.3 7.2 6.6 3 6 1 0 0  
Sicilia 29.1 49.7 7.8 9.6 3.6 9 14 0 3 0  
Sardegna 35.2 39.6 12.6 7.8 4.8 3 5 1 0 0  
Foreign constituency 47.1 24.5 - 6.4 22.0 4 1 0 0 1  
TOTAL      120 155 33 4 3  
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